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CIVIL

PROCEDURE

When Can aU.S. Court Order Production
of Materials for Use
inaForeign Authority's Investigation?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 386-389, © 2004 American Bar Association.

Under the Directorate-General's
procedures, it must conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt
of a complaint. The DirectorateGeneral may gather information on
its own, and it may provide the
complainant with an opportunity to
support its allegations. The initial
investigation is not considered an
adversarial proceeding. The
Directorate-General also has authority to seek information directly from
the alleged infringer and may punish a failure to provide information
with fines and penalties.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis.;
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377. Prof. Grenig is
co-author of West's Federal Civil
Discovery and Disclosure
(2d edition).

ISSUE
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782 authorize
federal district courts to order discovery for use in an investigation by
the Competition DirectorateGeneral of the European
Commission of the European
Community on the theory that the
investigation will lead to "a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" even if the information
sought would not be discoverable in
the foreign proceeding itself?

Completion of the DirectorateGeneral's preliminary investigation
results in a decision whether to pursue the complaint. If the decision is
not to proceed, the complainant is
notified and given an opportunity to
submit further information in support of its allegations. The EC then
decides, in a final written decision,
whether to formally proceed. A
decision not to proceed is subject to
review by the Court of First
Instance and ultimately by the

FACTS
Intel Corporation and Advanced
Micro Devices Inc. (AMD) are worldwide competitors in the microprocessor industry. In October
2000, AMD filed a complaint with
the Competition DirectorateGeneral of the European
Commission, claiming that Intel was
abusing its dominant market position in the European Common
Market in violation of European
Community competition laws.
Specifically, the complaint alleged
that Intel had violated Article 82 of
the treatv establishing the European
Commission (EC).
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Court of Justice for the European
Community.
A decision to proceed with the complaint is handled in a slightly different manner. If the EC makes a preliminary determination that
infringement may have occurred, it
serves a statement of objections on
the alleged infringer and appoints
an independent hearing officer to
conduct a hearing. The hearing officer then presents conclusions to the
Directorate-General, which makes a
recommendation to the EC on how
to proceed. A decision by the EC to
dismiss is subject to review by the
Court of First Instance. If the EC
decides to proceed with the complaint, a preliminary decision is
drafted and forwarded to the EC's
Advisory Committee, consisting of
representatives of the EC's member
states. The Advisory Committee
drafts an opinion for the EC that, if
adopted, becomes a final enforceable decision within the European
Community.
As part of its investigation in this
case, the Directorate-General submitted written questions to Intel
concerning AMD's allegations. The
Directorate-General provided AMD a
redacted copy of Intel's response
and sought AMD's comments. In
preparing its response, AMD became
aware that Intel had previously produced documents in another lawsuit
in federal court in Alabama that
could have a bearing on the allegations in AMD's complaint with the
Directorate-General. Many of the
documents had been submitted to
the Alabama federal court in summary judgment proceedings.
AMD asked the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of
California to authorize discovery
under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and require
Intel to produce documents and
transcripts of testimony from the
proceeding in Alabama. Intel object-

ed to the discovery of the approximately 600,000 pages of documents,
arguing that the matter before the
Directorate-General was not a "proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal" within the meaning of §
1782.
The U.S. district court ruled in favor
of Intel. The federal court emphasized that AMD's complaint to the
EC is "in the initial stage of preliminary inquiry" and that the EC, "in
the conduct of the investigation,
performs the functions of investigator, prosecutor and decision-maker
without any separation." The court
also concluded that the EC does not
conduct adjudicatory "proceedings"
and is not a "tribunal" for purposes
of § 1782. AMD appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
Noting that this was a matter of first
impression, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court. 292 F.3d
664 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth
Circuit explained that in its view,
the Directorate-General qualified as
a "foreign or international tribunal"
under § 1782. Moreover, according
to the Ninth Circuit, the proceeding
for which discovery is sought under
§ 1782 need not be imminent.
The court also ruled that § 1782
does not require that the material
being sought under that section be
discoverable in a foreign proceeding,
regardless of whether the request
comes from a private party or a foreign tribunal. The court found nothing in the plain language or legislative history of § 1782 requiring a
threshold showing by the party
seeking discovery that what it seeks
would be discoverable in the foreign
proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court to "proceed to consider AMD's request on
the merits." Intel asked the

Supreme Court to review the Ninth
Circuit Court's decision. While its
petition for certiorari was pending, a
magistrate judge issued a recommended order of discovery limiting
the relief to include only those documents directly relevant to the EC
proceedings. The district court has
held further consideration of that
recommendation in abeyance pending the disposition of the questions
presented by Intel's petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted
Intel's petition for review. 124 S.Ct.
531 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 1782 of Title 28 of the
United States Code provides that a
district court may order the production of documents or testimony "for
use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal or upon the
application of any interested person." Amendments to § 1782 in
1964 eliminated the requirement
that a foreign proceeding be "pending" and eliminated references to
"civil action" and "judicial," referring only to discovery of evidence
"for use in a proceeding in a foreign
or international tribunal." A 1996
amendment to § 1782 permits discovery to aid foreign "criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation."
Intel argues that § 1782 does not
authorize a private nonlitigant to
come to a U.S. court to obtain, for
the ostensible benefit of a foreign
law-enforcement authority, massive
discovery that it could not otherwise obtain under U.S. law and that
the foreign authority itself would
not authorize the nonlitigant to
receive if the evidence in question
were within its jurisdiction. In addition, Intel maintains that such discovery is unavailable in any event
when there is no live "proceeding in
a foreign ... tribunal" in the first

place.
(Continued on Page 388)
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Intel contends that § 1782 does not
authorize discovery that would otherwise be unavailable to private
nonlitigants under both U.S. law and
foreign law. It points out that private-party discovery is unavailable
in connection with EC antitrust
investigations, because the EC has
deliberately chosen to keep such
investigations from becoming adversarial proceedings. In addition, Intel
says that, if AMD had complained
about Intel to U.S. antitrust authorities rather than to the EC, it would
have no right under any provision of
U.S. law to obtain these documents.
Because AMD has not filed suit
against Intel and thus has not
assumed the responsibilities of an
actual litigant, Intel says that it is a
mere complainant to law enforcement authorities and therefore normally not entitled to obtain prelitigation civil discovery from prospective defendants.
It is Intel's position that § 1782 was
enacted to place tribunals and litigants abroad in a position similar to
the one they would occupy, for discovery purposes, if the evidence
they sought were located in the foreign jurisdiction rather than in the
United States. Intel argues that
Congress did not intend to magnify
the importance of geographic location by granting parties far greater
discovery rights when the evidence
sought happens to be located outside, rather than inside, the jurisdiction in which the discovery
would be used.
AMD asserts that § 1782 does not
include any such "discoverability"
requirement. It argues that the aim
of § 1782 is to provide liberal discovery to those involved in foreign
proceedings so as to encourage foreign jurisdictions to provide liberal
discovery to those involved in
American proceedings. AMD contends that subjecting foreign tribunals and interested persons to a

costly and time-consuming fight
over the nuances of foreign law
would undermine these aims.
Intel contends that AMD's position
in this matter is as inconsistent with
the text and legislative record of §
1782 as it is with the basic comity
goals of the statute. According to
Intel, nowhere in § 1782 did
Congress express any intent to create a new species of prelitigation
civil discovery available neither in
this country nor abroad. As to the
1996 amendment, Intel states that
the amendment further demonstrates that Congress wished to limit
prelitigation discovery to criminal
investigations conducted by foreign
sovereigns or their agents.
AMD says that the comity concerns
do not justify denying it discovery
under the terms of § 1782.
According to AMD, there is no risk
that parties will amass pretextual filings with the EC simply to obtain
discovery under § 1782. AMD also
rejects Intel's contention that the
EC and other tribunals would be
offended by an order granting §
1782 discovery of documents that
would not be discoverable in the
foreign proceeding. AMD claims that
the EC affirmatively welcomes the
submission of evidence by a complainant, even when it would not
itself afford the complainant compulsory discovery rights.
Intel argues that AMD's application
should be denied because no "proceeding" is now underway in a "foreign or international tribunal." Intel
claims that AMD's approach would
permit anyone to obtain a rival's
documents in the United States,
even in the absence of a foreign
investigation, upon declaring an
intent to trigger such an event or
file a lawsuit at some indefinite period in the future.

AMD responds that its request
unambiguously seeks documents for
use in a "proceeding" in a "tribunal." First, it says that the document it seeks will be used in the
quasi-judicial and judicial proceedings that necessarily will result from
the current stage of the EC's proceedings. Even if the current investigative stage is not yet a pending
"proceeding" within the meaning of
§ 1782, AMD argues that the section
does not require that a proceeding
be "pending" before discovery may
be ordered. AMD points out that
Congress deleted the word "pending" from § 1782 in the 1964
revision.
Second, AMD declares that the current EC proceeding is itself a "proceeding" in a "tribunal" within the
meaning of § 1782. It is AMD's position that the contemporaneous historical record shows that § 1782's
drafters specifically considered EC
proceedings to be "within the compass of the statute."
Intel suggests that the Supreme
Court adopt rules of practice precluding private nonlitigants from
obtaining § 1782 discovery when
either (1) such discovery would be
unavailable in the foreign jurisdiction if the documents were located
there, or (2) there is no live foreign
proceeding. According to Intel, the
alternative to clear rules of practice
is a regime in which district courts
are permitted to resolve these internationally significant issues on an
unpredictable, case-by-case basis.
AMD disagrees, arguing that the
Supreme Court should not impose,
as general rules governing the exercise of discretion, the very requirements Congress chose not to
include in the statutory text.
Furthermore, AMD contends that
the presence of the EC as amicus
supporting denial of discovery in
this particular case does not support

Issue No. 7

the establishment of such rules of
practice. Acknowledging that the EC
supports "aspects of Intel's untenable interpretation of the statute
itself," AMD points out that the EC
makes no suggestion that, if the
statute must be read to allow the
district court to order production to
AMD, the court nevertheless should
deny AMD the documents it seeks.
According to AMD, the EC would be
obliged to consider such evidence if
AMD obtained and submitted it, and
such evidence could be of significant value not only to the EC's
investigation but also to any subsequent judicial review of the EC's
decision on whether or not to act
against Intel. In order to obtain the
benefits of such discovery, AMD
urges that an order must be issued
promptly so that AMD can vindicate
both its procedural right to support
its EC complaint and its substantive
right to operate in a competitive
marketplace.
SIGNIFICANCE
In contrast with the Ninth Circuit's
decision, the First and Eleventh
Circuits have construed § 1782 as
imposing a requirement that an
applicant show that it could obtain
the discovery it is seeking in EC
proceedings. In re Application of
Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1, 5-7 (1st
Cir. 1992); In re Requestfor
Assistancefrom Ministry of Legal
Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848
F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988).
Like the Ninth Circuit, however, the
Second and Third Circuits have
refused to impose such a requirement. In re Application of Malev
HungarianAirlines, 964 F.2d 97,
101-02 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Bayer
AG, 146 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir.
1998). The remaining circuits that
have considered the issue have distinguished between a request from a
foreign tribunal and one from a private party and have not imposed a
discoverability requirement on the
former. In re Letter of Request from
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Amstgericht Ingolstadt, Fed.
Republic of Germany, 82 F.3d 590,
592-93 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Letter
Rogatoryfrom First Court of First
Instance in Civil Matters (5th Cir.
1995).
According to the EC, permitting discovery requests on the grounds
endorsed by the Ninth Circuit
would undermine the EC's carefully
balanced policies regarding the disclosure of confidential information
by allowing complainants to obtain
through § 1782 documents that
they are not permitted to review
under European law. The EC asserts
that upholding the Ninth Circuit
could encourage companies to file
pretextual complaints with the EC
solely in order to use § 1782, wasting the EC's scarce resources. In
addition, the EC says that characterizing it as a "tribunal" poses serious threats to its anticartel
Leniency Program by jeopardizing
the EC's ability to maintain the confidentiality of documents submitted
to it.
The Chamber of Commerce of the
United States suggests that affirming
the Ninth Circuit's decision would
impermissibly broaden the scope of
discovery that is allowed private
parties who are seeking information
from their business rivals under §
1782. The Chamber says that the
Ninth Circuit's decision would govern any time a company from which
discovery is sought is subject to the
jurisdiction of any foreign sovereign's courts or regulatory bodies. It
claims that important disincentives
to harassing and unwarranted discovery requests would be eliminated
if the Ninth Circuit's ruling is permitted to stand.
The United States, on the other
hand, says that the Ninth Circuit
was correct in ruling that § 1782
does not categorically preclude a
district court from providing assis-
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tance to a complainant in a EC proceeding that will ultimately result in
an adjudication. It contends that
district courts should retain discretion to take into consideration foreign discoverability in the course
of considering whether to render
the requested assistance under §
1782. The United States also questions whether the EC's views are
widely shared in the international
community.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Intel Corporation (Seth P.
Waxman, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
(202) 663-6000)
For Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
(Patrick Lynch, O'Melveny & Myers
(213) 430-6000)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Intel Corporation
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States (Roy T. Englert Jr.
(202) 775-4500)
Commission of the European
Communities (Jonathan L. Abram
(202) 637-5681)
Product Liability Advisory
Council, Inc. (Kenneth S. Geller
(202) 263-3000)
In Support of Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc.
United States (Paul D. Clement,
Acting Solicitor General (202) 5142217)

